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I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution com-
mands that the right of individuals to be secure against unreasonable
searches shall not be violated. The amendment further provides that a
search warrant must be supported by probable cause and particularly
describe the place to be searched and items to be seized.' The United
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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States Supreme Court has held that the only effective means of enforc-
ing this mandate is to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant that violates the fourth amendment because it lacks either par-
ticularity or probable cause.2 Difficult questions arise, however, when a
warrant contains some clauses that are constitutionally sufficient, meet-
ing both the particularity and probable cause requirements, and some
clauses that are constitutionally deficient. Should a court suppress all
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant because of the defect, ad-
mit all of the evidence because of the constitutional clauses, or apply an
intermediate standard-sever the warrant to admit the evidence seized
pursuant to constitutional portions while suppressing the evidence at-
tributable to unconstitutional portions? What impact, if any, should
proof of the executing officer's good faith reliance on the validity of the
warrant have on the court's decision? Should this good faith reliance
cure the defects in the warrant, allowing the fact-finder to consider all
the evidence, illegally as well as legally obtained? And finally, if the
officer's reliance on the partially invalid warrant is determined not to be
objectively reasonable, should this finding be grounds for suppression of
the evidence seized under the valid portions?
These questions arise when the modern doctrine of redaction3 is
considered in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.4
"Redaction" is a procedure employed by a reviewing court to excise the
severable portions of a warrant that are constitutionally invalid for lack
of probable cause or particularity. This method preserves evidence
seized pursuant to the valid portions of the warrant. 5 Although the Su-
preme Court has not addressed the propriety of redaction or the effect
of the Leon decision on redaction, the Court's position on these issues is
fairly easy to predict in light of the Court's recent pro-government deci-
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that in state trials the fourteenth
amendment requires exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that in federal trials the fourth amendment re-
quires suppression of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure).
3. Except for a few cases decided in the 1920s discussing by implication the concept of redac-
tion, only modern cases have addressed directly the propriety of severance. The leading state case
adopting severance is Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13
Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961).
4. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
5. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d. Cir. 1982). A court should follow three
steps in redacting a warrant: (1) divide the warrant into separate clauses; (2) evaluate each individ-
ual clause to determine whether it meets both the particularity and the probable cause require-
ments of the fourth amendment; (3) suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the clauses that fail
to meet the fourth amendment requirements and admit all other probative evidence. See id. at
759-60; Comment, Redaction-The Alternative to the Total Suppression of Evidence Seized Pur-
suant to a Partially Invalid Search Warrant, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 77, 93 (1984).
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sions.8 However, in state criminal cases based upon state constitutions
or statutes, courts may reject the Supreme Court's restrictive federal
constitutional interpretations.7 Indeed, many state courts have provided
greater protection to their citizens' privacy rights by construing their
constitutional provisions more liberally than the Supreme Court has
construed the United States Constitution.8
This Note first examines the process and propriety of redaction.
Part III analyzes the reasoning behind and criticisms of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the exclusionary rule and pronouncement of a
good faith exception in United States v. Leon. Part IV explores how
the redaction and Leon doctrines interrelate in the case of partially in-
valid search warrants. Part V examines the reaction of state courts to
Leon and concludes that redaction sometimes will be useful in admit-
ting reliable evidence that Leon would suppress. More importantly, re-
daction effectively can suppress evidence obtained pursuant to invalid
portions of a warrant that Leon would admit. In this way, redaction
allows state courts to provide greater privacy protection to their citizens
while achieving the law enforcement goal of admitting all evidence le-
gally obtained.
II. THE PROCESS AND PROPRIETY OF REDACTION
Under the traditional view of the exclusionary rule, if a magistrate
makes one technical mistake in issuing a search warrant, all the evi-
dence obtained pursuant to the otherwise valid warrant must be sup-
pressed at trial, and, as a result, the criminal may go free.9 To avoid the
severe remedy of complete suppression in such cases, courts increas-
ingly have applied the rules of redaction. State courts that have consid-
ered the issue almost uniformly have adopted this practice. 0 Most
federal courts have followed this trend, with eight federal appellate
6. See, for example, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in which the Court lessened the
probable cause standard for issuance of warrants to require affirmance of the magistrate's judg-
ment if the judicial officer merely had a "substantial basis" for concluding that a "fair probability"
exists that evidence will be found. Gates overruled the strict "two-pronged" standard, which re-
quired a finding of both the informant's "reliability" and "basis for knowledge." See Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
7. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 243, 491 A.2d 37, 45 (1985).
9. Professor LaFave notes the severity of exclusion in this situation. He comments that "it
would be harsh medicine indeed" if a warrant issued essentially in compliance with the fourth
amendment must be invalidated in toto simply because the magistrate made a minor error in the
language of the warrant. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 258 (2d ed. 1987).
10. For a collection of state cases adopting severance, see United States v. Giresi, 488
F. Supp. 445, 459 n.17 (D.N.J. 1980), and Comment, supra note 5, at 81 n.27.
19881
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:811
courts expressly adopting redaction.11 Courts consider redaction pri-
marily because of its appeal as a fair alternative to suppression of all
reliable evidence when only a portion of the warrant is invalid.1" Courts
accept redaction as a constitutionally proper doctrine on two grounds:
the doctrine comports with the requirements of the fourth amendment,
and the procedure is consistent with the underlying purposes of the ex-
clusionary rule.'"
The fourth amendment's commands are twofold. The amendment
requires a search warrant to satisfy both particularity and probable
cause elements.' 4 The Supreme Court has held that to satisfy the par-
ticularity requirement, the warrant must describe the place to be
searched and the items to be seized in sufficient detail to leave nothing
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Most courts find
that the particularity requirement is satisfied if the officer executing the
warrant can identify the items sought with reasonable certainty. 6 In
order to meet the probable cause requirement, a magistrate must find it
probable 7 that the items to be seized will be evidence of criminal activ-
ity and that they will be found at the place to be searched.'
The Framers' purpose in drafting the fourth amendment was to
prohibit indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted pursuant to
11. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit coined the term "redaction" in
United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982). Other courts have used the terms "sever-
ance," "partial suppression," or "severability" to describe the process. See United States v. Cook,
657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. Unit A 1984); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1983); Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 576 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1982); United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 298, 300 n.5 (1st Cir. 1982);
United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d
942, 952 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Torch, 609 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1979); Huffman v. United States, 470
F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on reh'g on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11.
13. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (see supra note 1 for pertinent text of the fourth amendment).
15. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 752 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v.
Marron, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); State v. Knoll,
116 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 343 N.W.2d 391, 395, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1986). Professor LaFave
states that a literal reading of the Marron standard would mean that few warrants would pass the
test. Only descriptions so detailed that the officer could not mistake one object for another could
meet such a particularity threshold. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 234. Courts allow a more gen-
eral description when the property to be seized could not be expected to have more precise charac-
teristics. United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950 (1979).
17. The Supreme Court has held that although mere suspicion is insufficient, probable cause
requires less evidence than is necessary for a criminal offense conviction. See Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see also United States v. Ventressa, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965).
18. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). For an articulation of the standard a
reviewing court must follow in evaluating a magistrate's probable cause determination, see supra
note 6.
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general warrants.' 9 A general warrant authorizes a general exploratory
search through an individual's possessions. 20 In United States v. Chris-
tine2' the Third Circuit stated five functions of the particularity and
probable cause elements of the warrants clause:22 (1) the probable cause
requirement protects citizens from unreasonable invasions of privacy
and unfounded criminal charges; 23 (2) the neutral and detached magis-
trate's determination of the justification to search prevents unnecessary
searches; 2 (3) the particularity requirement restrains the scope of the
search;25 (4) the warrant requirement gives notice of the authority, ne-
cessity, and scope of the search to the individual subject to the intru-
sion;26 and (5) the warrant itself provides a record for subsequent
judicial review.27
The Christine court concluded that redaction comports with each
of the five purposes that the warrant clause advances.2 " First, according
to the court, redaction retains the protection against unjustified inva-
sions of privacy because only evidence seized pursuant to the constitu-
tionally valid portion is admitted. 9 Second, redaction advances the
objective of interjecting a judicial officer between the citizen and the
law enforcement officer because the court may redact only those war-
rants properly issued by magistrates.30 Third, because redaction pre-
serves only evidence seized pursuant to those clauses that particularly
describe the items seized, it does not approve or induce intrusions
19. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). In colonial days, customs officials obtained
writs of assistance giving them complete discretion to search for goods imported in violation of
British tax laws. Id. at 583 n.21.
20. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
21. 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 756 (summarizing the functions of the warrant clause as articulated by other
courts).
23. Id. at 756 (finding that the warrant clause reconciles the citizen's interest "in being safe-
guarded from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime" with the community's interest in "fair leeway for enforcing the law") (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
24. Christine, 687 F.2d at 756; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)
(finding that the warrant clause requires that a neutral and detached judicial officer weigh the
need to invade privacy against the need to enforce the law).
25. Christine, 687 F.2d at 756; see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 & n.7
(1980) (finding that a warrant's specific terms limit the scope of intrusion).
26. Christine, 687 F.2d at 756; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (stat-
ing that a warrant informs an individual whose property is to be searched of the executing officer's
authority and of the necessity of and limits on the search).
27. Christine, 687 F.2d at 756-57; see also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (finding
that a warrant serves as the basis for evaluating information that an officer presented to a magis-
trate at the time the warrant was sought).




outside the proper scope of the search."' Fourth, the valid portions of
the warrant that remain after redaction notify the individual whose pri-
vacy is invaded by the search of the officer's authority and the necessity
and limits of the search.3 2 Finally, redaction has no effect on the crea-
tion of a record for future judicial review.33
Courts adopting redaction conclude that, in addition to adequately
serving the goals of the warrant clause, the redaction doctrine is consis-
tent with the purposes of the judicially created exclusionary rule.4 The
justifications for the exclusionary rule are, primarily, deterrence of po-
lice conduct that violates the fourth amendment 3 and, secondarily,
preservation of judicial integrity. 6 Application of the exclusionary rule
requires a pragmatic balancing of the incremental benefits the rule pro-
vides with the social cost of excluding highly probative evidence from
criminal trials.3 7 By redacting a warrant to preserve validly obtained
evidence while excluding illegally seized evidence, the goals of deter-
rence and judicial integrity are achieved with little cost. Because the
court suppresses evidence the officer obtained outside the constitutional
scope of the warrant, redaction deters officers from engaging in general
searches. Redaction, then, is analogous to the courts' treatment of over-
reaching. Overreaching occurs when an officer seizes evidence beyond
the scope authorized by the magistrate in a valid warrant. 8 In redac-
tion, as in overreaching, courts suppress only evidence not validly ob-
tained. 9 Although both overreaching and redaction subject individuals
to privacy invasions by searches that extend beyond constitutional au-




34. The exclusionary rule is a remedy requiring that evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment be excluded from trial. The rule is not a constitutional right of individuals but is
based on the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over the lower federal courts. Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976).
35. Id. at 486.
36. Although Supreme Court decisions allude to the "imperative of judicial integrity," sug-
gesting that suppression of illegally obtained evidence prevents contaminating the integrity of the
judicial process, they also demonstrate that this concern has limited force. The Court has qualified
the judicial integrity argument by failing to take the logical extension of this argument, which
would call for the exclusion of highly probative evidence whenever illegally seized, even in grand
jury proceedings, for impeachment purposes, and in cases where the defendant fails to object. Id.
at 484-85.
37. Id. at 487-88; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings because the possible injury to the function
of the grand jury outweighed the uncertain incremental deterrent effect).
38. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982); see also United States v.
Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 735 n.5 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); United States v. Giresi, 488 F. Supp. 445, 460
n.18 (D.N.J. 1980); People v. Mangialino, 75 Misc. 2d 698, 707-09, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327, 338-39 (1973).
39. Christine, 687 F.2d at 758.
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evidence in order to prosecute criminal activity outweighs these limited
intrusions.4 °
The propriety of redaction is further established by the restrictions
on its application that ensure that fourth amendment policies are not
compromised. Courts utilize redaction only when the warrant is found
not to be essentially general in nature.41 Thus, redaction cannot be used
to save minor clauses in a warrant that authorizes a highly intrusive
privacy violation.
Courts have opposed redaction as being inconsistent with the man-
dates of the fourth amendment. In In Re Lafayette Academy 42 the
court reasoned that if the fourth amendment is to protect the privacy
rights of individuals, courts must apply it to the whole search.43 Redac-
tion, therefore, is unconstitutional because it selectively applies the
fourth amendment's particularity and probable cause mandates.44 This
argument fails to consider, however, that in redacting a warrant, the
court tests each clause for compliance with the fourth amendment.
Thus, redaction subjects the whole warrant to a constitutional evalua-
tion.' With invalid clauses stricken, the properly redacted warrant en-
sures that only evidence seized in compliance with the fourth
amendment will be admitted at trial.46 Moreover, if the search author-
ized by the warrant is essentially general in nature, redaction would not
be an available alternative, and all evidence would be suppressed.47
Other courts oppose redaction as being inconsistent with the fourth
40. "The cost of suppressing all the evidence seized, including that seized pursuant to the
valid portions of the warrant, is so great that the lesser benefits accruing to the interests served by
the [f]ourth [a]mendment cannot justify complete suppression." Id. (emphasis in original).
41. In Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal. Rptr.
415 (1961), the court made the following, often quoted comment:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable
under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are
essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity,
and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure
would in any event- be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
Id. at 797, 362 P.2d at 52, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 420. Other courts similarly express the limitation. See,
e.g., Christine, 687 F.2d at 754 (finding that "[r]edaction is inappropriate when the valid portions
of the warrant may not be meaningfully severable from the warrant as a whole"); Cook, 657 F.2d at
735 n.6 (denying redaction when valid parts are "included by the Government as a pretext to
support an otherwise unlawful search and seizure"); Gerisi, 488 F. Supp. at 459 (holding that sev-
erance is improper when a warrant is "facially general in nature").
42. 462 F. Supp. 767 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1979).
43. 462 F. Supp. at 772.
44. Id.
45. See Comment, supra note 5, at 90 (arguing that redaction is consistent with fourth
amendment mandates).
46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
amendment because it creates a fiction by treating one search as two,
by upholding a legal search under the valid portions, and by voiding an
illegal search under the invalid portions.4 These courts misinterpret
the focus of redaction. 49 Rather than comparing the search with fourth
amendment requirements, a redacting court scrutinizes the warrant,
which must be sufficiently valid in order to qualify for redaction.50
Another criticism of redaction is that it allows a reviewing court to
exceed its judicial role by rewriting the warrant.5 However, because the
redacting court merely is excising invalid portions while preserving the
valid portions the court is not writing any of its own language into the
warrant. Nor is the court significantly altering the overall warrant be-
cause the warrant already has surpassed a threshold test of significant
validity.
52
A final argument against redaction is that it may encourage law
enforcement officers to seek warrants that authorize searches beyond
the scope of probable cause." Redaction critics fear that because the
officer knows that at least the evidence obtained pursuant to the valid
portions of the warrant will be admitted, the officer will search broadly,
hoping that the redacting judge will admit items that would not have
been seized had the warrant been issued properly. The officer then
could assert that the evidence seized under the overbroad warrant was
found in plain view during the search for the particular items. This ar-
gument is easily answered, however, because when redaction is restric-
tively and properly administered, the redacting court's scrutiny ensures
that the fourth amendment protection against general warrants is
preserved.54
48. Courts making this criticism include United States v. Hatfield, 461 F. Supp. 57, 58 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Burch, 432
F. Supp. 961, 964 (D. Del. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1978).
49. Comment, supra note 5, at 90.
50. See United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 759 (3d Cir. 1982), in which the court argues
that upholding a search by comparing the evidence seized against the fourth amendment require-
ments renders the magistrate's intervention a mere formality and violates the notification princi-
ple. Redaction does not raise these concerns because it focuses on a duly issued, valid warrant.
51. Comment, supra note 5, at 90; see also Brief for Appellee at 14, United States v. Chris-
tine, 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982).
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950
(1983).
54. The Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion, stating:
We believe, however, that careful administration of the [redaction] rule will afford full protec-
tion to individual rights. First, magistrates must exercise vigilance to detect pretext and bad
faith on the part of law enforcement officials. Second, courts should rigorously apply the ex-
clusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portions of the warrant. Third,
items not described in the sufficiently particular portions of the warrant will not be admissi-
ble unless it appears that (a) the police found the item in a place where one would reasonably
[Vol. 41:811
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Although many commentators have criticized redaction, its value in
the preservation of evidence cannot be underestimated. Magistrates
and law enforcement officials unavoidably will make mistakes in draft-
ing search warrants. Redaction provides courts with a necessary tool to
remedy such mistakes and thereby preserves probative evidence seized
from an otherwise legal search.
III. GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. United States v. Leon: Holding and Rationale
In United States v. Leon55 the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admis-
sion of evidence seized under a search warrant subsequently held to be
invalid if the executing officer reasonably relied on the warrant's valid-
ity. Justice White, writing for the six-to-three majority,58 announced a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 57 The Court limited its
holding to those cases in which the police officer's reliance on the con-
stitutional sufficiency of the warrant is objectively reasonable.58 Under
the Court's limitation, suppression remains the appropriate remedy in
four scenarios .5 First, the good faith exception will not apply if the po-
lice officer knew or should have known that the affidavit contained false
statements that misled the magistrate issuing the warrant.6 0 Second,
suppression will apply if the issuing magistrate "wholly abandoned" his
role as a neutral and detached judicial officer.8 ' Additionally, the good
faith exception is improper when an officer's reliance on the warrant is
unreasonable because the warrant lacks the requisite "indicia of proba-
ble cause. '6 2 Finally, suppression is still appropriate if the warrant fails
have expected them to look in the process of searching for the objects described in the suffi-
ciently particular portions of the warrant ... and (c) the other requirements of the plain
view rule-inadvertent discovery and probable cause to associate the item with criminal activ-
ity-are met.
Id.
55. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
56. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Justice White.
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
57. Id. at 922.
58. Id. at 920 & n.20. The Court stated that this "modification in objective reasonableness
retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as
a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 920 n.20 (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 261 n.15 (1983) (White, J., concurring)). The Court emphasized that
"[t]he objective standard ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law
prohibits." Id.
59. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
60. Id.; see, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
61. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; see, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
62. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J.,
19881
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to particularize the place to be searched or the items that are the sub-
ject of the search, again rendering the officer's reliance unreasonable."3
The majority reasoned that the exclusionary rule is a judge-made
rule and not a constitutional guarantee;64 thus, failure to exclude ille-
gally seized evidence is not a constitutional violation. 5 Concluding that
the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, the Court ap-
plied a cost-benefit approach to determine when the exclusionary rule
should be inapplicable to evidence seized in good faith reliance on a
warrant subsequently found to be defective.6 6 The Court concluded that
the costs of excluding probative evidence from trial when law enforce-
ment officials have acted in good faith clearly outweigh the benefits of
protecting the fourth amendment rights of the accused. 7
The Court recognized the deterrence of law enforcement miscon-
duct as the sole benefit derived from the exclusionary rule." The Court
stated that the exclusionary rule was not intended to punish a magis-
trate's error because excluding evidence seized pursuant to an improp-
erly issued warrant will not deter a magistrate.70 The Court contended
that the application of the exclusionary rule to suppress illegally seized
evidence could not cure a violation of an individual's constitutional
rights. 71 A proposition implicit in the Court's reasoning is that after a
defendant's fourth amendment rights have been violated, the rights
guaranteed by that amendment can be restored only by deterring police
concurring in part)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). This view contra-
dicts the Supreme Court's earlier interpretation of the exclusionary rule as a constitutional man-
date. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Commentators who ascribe to this "fragmentary"
view of the exclusionary rule contend that the court acts as an independent conduit for evidence,
"laundering" the "taint" from the illegal seizure as it enters the courtroom. See Schrock & Welsh,
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV.
251, 255-56 (1974).
65. Leon, 468 U.S. at 910.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 913.
68. Id. at 908.
69. Id. at 916. The Court stated that "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police mis-
conduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." Id.
70. The Court concluded that magistrates are not deterred by the threat of exclusion be-
cause, as neutral judicial officers removed from the law enforcement function, magistrates have "no
stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." Moreover, exclusion does not serve a
meaningful purpose in informing magistrates of their mistakes or in discouraging repeated error.
Id. at 916-17.
71. Id. at 906. The Court stated: "The [exclusionary] rule. . . operates as 'a judicially cre-
ated remedy designed to safeguard [f]ourth [a]mendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
[Vol. 41:811
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misconduct.72 A police officer who acts in good faith will not be deterred
when the evidence is excluded because he has not engaged in miscon-
duct.73 The Court reasoned that an officer generally cannot be expected
to question the magistrate's judgment on the sufficiency of a warrant.7
4
In effect, then, good faith on the part of the officer who violated defend-
ant's constitutional rights precludes the defendant's right to a remedy
because granting the remedy will not further the goal of deterrence.
7 5
Turning to the case at bar, the Court perfunctorily held that the police
officer acted in good faith and that his reliance on the invalid warrant
was objectively reasonable.7 6 All of the illegally seized evidence, there-
fore, was admissible at trial.
B. Flaws in the Leon Court's Rationale
The United States v. Leon decision has been the subject of much
recent controversy.78 Opponents of the decision contend that apart from
the adverse consequences that flow from the decision, the Court's ra-
tionale is seriously flawed for several reasons. Critics contend that the
Court's questionable logic can be explained only as a means to achieve a
policy-oriented result. 9
One of the major criticisms of the Leon decision is that adoption of
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was unnecessary. This
argument stems from the Court's recent relaxation of the probable
cause standard in Illinois v. Gates,80 which makes a good faith excep-
tion redundant and illogical. 1 In Gates82 the Supreme Court held that
72. Id. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 918-23 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 921.
75. See State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 243, 491 A.2d 37, 45 (1985) (rejecting Leon
on state constitutional grounds because a good faith exception "would violate a long-standing tra-
dition . . . of providing meaningful remedies for major constitutional violations").
76. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37 MERCER
L. REV. 957 (1986); Note, A Reasonable Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: No
Longer Letting the Criminal Go Free Because the Magistrate Has Blundered, 50 Mo. L. REV. 401
(1985); Case Comment, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure: The Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule-How Should Tennessee Decide?, 14 ME. ST. U.L. REv. 549 (1984).
79. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
80. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
81. Comment, Exclusionary Rule-The Good Faith Exception Is the Result of Constitu-
tional Amnesia, Leon, 1985 S. ILL. U.L.J. 113, 127; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 958 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that, "[g]iven the relaxed standard for assessing probable cause established
... in Illinois v. Gates, . . . the Court's newly fashioned good-faith exception ... will rarely, if
ever, offer any greater flexibility for police than the Gates standard already supplies" (citation
omitted)).
82. 462 U.S. at 213.
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a magistrate may properly issue a warrant if, under the totality of the
circumstances in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that seizable
evidence will be uncovered.8 3 Under this standard, a court reviewing a
magistrate's probable cause determination must uphold the decision if
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.8 4 Thus, before the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule can admit evidence that the Gates standard would otherwise
suppress, a reviewing court must find that a warrant lacks a substantial
basis for concluding that there is a fair probability that seizable evi-
dence would be found. But, at the same time, the reviewing court must
find that an officer's reliance on that invalid warrant was objectively
reasonable. 5 According to Justice Brennan in dissent,8 finding a case
in which there is a need for the good faith exception after Gates will be
virtually impossible. Objectively reasonable reliance on an objectively
unreasonable warrant is an illogical concept. 8
An additional flaw in the Leon Court's reasoning is the Court's fail-
ure to offer any empirical evidence to support conclusively the need for
an exception to the exclusionary rule.89 The Court admitted that no
empirical data was available to prove the necessity of the exception to
the exclusionary rule.90 Despite this inconclusiveness, the Leon Court
gave the good faith exception implicit approval by placing the burden
of proving the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on its proponents.9 1
Critics also assert that the majority violated the language and in-
tent of the fourth amendment by narrowly construing the purposes
served by the exclusionary rule in order to give credence to a good faith
exception.9 2 In the Court's early articulation and expansion of the ex-
83. Id. at 238. The court stated that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him,. . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." Id.
84. Id. at 238-39.
85. See, Comment, supra note 81, at 127.
86. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 958. Justice Brennan explained that this is so "[blecause the two standards overlap
so completely." Id.
88. Id. at 958-59.
89. Comment, supra note 81, at 127. In his Leon dissent, Justice Brennan characterizes the
majority's conclusions as "inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and occasional
pieces of partial and often inconclusive data." Leon, 468 U.S. at 942 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (majority opinion). Professor Oaks, author of the most extensive
study of available data on the exclusionary rule, concludes that there is no empirical substantiation
or refutation of the rule's deterrent effect. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 665, 706-09 (1970).
91. Comment, supra note 81, at 127.
92. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 935-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in Leon and concurring in Sheppard); Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
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clusionary rule, the Court portrayed the branches of government as es-
sential components of a single prosecution network. 3 The Court read
the fourth amendment as restricting government as a whole in order to
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice process and to prevent the
government from benefitting from constitutional violations." Underly-
ing the Court's earlier opinions was the conclusion that the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment constituted
a constitutional wrong independent of the initial seizure.95 In the 1960
case of Elkins v. United States9" the Court asserted that a conviction
based on illegally obtained evidence makes the court an accomplice in
disobedience of the law.9 7 Critics of Leon contend that this unitary
view98 of the exclusionary rule expressed in the Court's earlier decisions
is the correct interpretation of the fourth amendment and reject the
Leon Court's reliance on the fragmentary view9 as a distortion of the
rule's intended purposes. 100 According to the fragmentary theory ex-
pressed in Leon, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the judiciary
plays an inconsequential role in the criminal justice process. 10 Acting
as a mere neutral conduit for evidence, the judiciary does not violate
the rights of the accused by allowing illegally seized evidence to be in-
troduced at trial.1
0 2
In his dissent to Leon, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's
adoption of the fragmentary view of the exclusionary rule. He argued
that the Court's emasculation of the judiciary's role in safeguarding
fourth amendment rights of the accused renders those safeguards
United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 27 B.C.L. REv. 609, 629-31 (1986); Com-
ment, supra note 81, at 128-29.
93. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (finding that the exclusionary rule is required in state courts when state officials
seize evidence in violation of fourth amendment).
94. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
95. Id. at 398; see also Note, supra note 92, at 617.
96. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
97. Id. at 223 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
98. See, e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 610 & n.12. Under the "unitary" model of prosecution,
"[the purpose of the [exclusionary] rule is to restrain the government as a whole in its attempts to
discover and punish law-breakers." Id. at 610. "[B]y excluding evidence 'the court stops the entire
government, of which it is a part, from consummating a wrongful course of conduct-a course of
conduct begun but by no means ended when the police invade the defendant's privacy."' Id. at
610 n.20 (quoting Schrock & Welsh, supra note 64, at 257-60).
99. See Note, supra note 92, at 610 & n.11.
100. See supra note 92.
101. Note, supra note 92, at 610 n.11.
102. Id. According to the fragmentary view, "Whatever 'taint' may have accrued from the
illegal seizure is 'laundered' as it passes through the hands of the judiciary." Id.; see also Leon, 468
U.S. at 906 (finding that the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment




meaningless. 103 Justice Brennan asserted that courts cannot avoid re-
sponsibility for the means by which evidence is obtained.104 He asserted
that the police in their evidence-procurement role are linked inextrica-
bly to the courts in their evidence-admitting role because each is
equally capable of circumventing an individual's fourth amendment
rights.
10 5
Justice Stevens in his dissent to Leon agreed that the majority's
fragmentary analysis was incorrect in viewing the courts and police as
separate entities in the criminal justice process.106 Justice Stevens also
implied that courts, in admitting illegally seized evidence, may be more
culpable than law enforcement officials who made the initial privacy in-
trusion. He argued that if illegally seized evidence is admitted, then the
court becomes the "motivating force" in the fourth amendment viola-
tion.10 7 Thus, when the judiciary recognizes a good faith exception to
admit illegally obtained evidence, courts become constitutional violators
by admitting the fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure."'5
Critics of the Leon decision not only dispute the Court's fragmen-
tary view of the exclusionary rule but also condemn the premise on
which that view is founded. The Leon Court explained that the exclu-
sionary rule serves as a restraint only on law enforcement because the
sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of official miscon-
duct.10 9 A dissenting Justice Brennan argued that the Court's logic is
flawed because it considers only one comparatively minor aspect of the
recognized deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule."0 Justice Bren-
nan contended that the majority misinterpreted the deterrence ration-
ale behind the exclusionary rule because the rule was not created to
103. Leon, 468 U.S. at 936 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
[C]ertainly nothing in the language or history of the [f]ourth [almendment suggests that a
recognition of this evidentiary link between the police and the courts was meant to be fore-
closed. It is difficult to give any meaning at all to the limitations imposed by the
[a]mendment if they are read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but to allow
other agents of the same government to take advantage of evidence secured by the police in
violation of its requirements. The [a]mendment therefore must be read to condemn not only
the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is done, after all, for the purpose of
securing evidence-but also the subsequent use of any evidence so obtained.
Id. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
104. Id. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 938.
106. Id. at 976-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Leon and concurring in Sheppard).
107. See id. at 978.
108. See Note, supra note 92, at 631, in which the author states: "Just as it makes no differ-
ence to the victim whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or a state
official, it would not matter to him whether his rights were violated by a policeman or a judge." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
109. 468 U.S. at 916.
110. See id. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 41:811
REDACTION DOCTRINE
punish law enforcement officials who do not follow fourth amendment
procedures."' Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court had recog-
nized in its earlier decisions" 2 that the proper function of the exclu-
sionary rule is to promote institution-wide compliance with the fourth
amendment." 3 Under this institutional view, the serious consequences
that result when the exclusionary rule is imposed initiate an overall
educational effect." 4 Police department policy-makers are encouraged
to carefully formulate policies in strict compliance with fourth amend-
ment constraints.1 5 In a recent exhaustive study of the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule, the author similarly concluded that institu-
tional reforms that reinforce adherence to the fourth amendment by
individual police officers are directly dependent on strict application of
the exclusionary rule."8 The author determined that the exclusionary
rule acts as an institutional deterrent, motivating the police depart-
ment, the state attorney general's office, and the courts to adopt pro-
grams and procedures that ensure compliance with the fourth
amendment."
7
Proponents of this institutional view of the exclusionary rule claim
that even when the individual police officer acts with a reasonable, yet
mistaken, belief that the warrant is constitutional, imposition of the ex-
clusionary sanction still will have a significant long term deterrent ef-
fect."' Consistent exclusion of evidence in these situations necessarily
111. Id. Justice Brennan stated that "what the Court overlooks is that the deterrence ration-
ale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of 'punishment' of
individual police officers for their failures to obey the restraints imposed by the [flourth
[a]mendment." Id.
112. Justice Brennan quoted Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976), in which the Court
stated: "[O]ver the long term, [the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary rule] that our
society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage
those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorpo-
rate [f]ourth [a]mendment ideals into their value system." Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting State v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976)).
113. Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan notes that Justice
Stewart authored an article that identified the exclusionary rule as "designed to produce a 'system-
atic deterrence."' Id. at 953 n.12 (quoting Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1400 (1983)).
114. Leon, 468 U.S. at 954-55 (Brennan J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "[iut is
only through such an institutionwide mechanism that information concerning [f]ourth
[a]mendment standards can be effectively communicated to rank-and-file officers." Id. at 954.
115. Id. at 954-55.
116. Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1016, 1054 (1987) (study based on extensive interviews with
Chicago narcotics officers documenting the significant deterrence effects the exclusionary rule
serves).
117. Id. at 1017.
118. Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would encourage police departments to warn their officers that they
cannot assume automatically that a warrant is valid simply because it
has been issued by a magistrate.119 Officers would be instructed in ap-
plying for warrants to devote significant attention to preparing affida-
vits replete with information to meet stringent probable cause
standards and to review the warrant carefully for constitutional defects
when it is issued.120 In contrast, if a good faith exception is available,
critics claim that police departments will be far less concerned with ed-
ucating their officers about fourth amendment prohibitions., 2 ' As a re-
sult, the Leon decision severely reduces the incentive for police to
follow the procedures that the Constitution requires and encourages po-
lice ignorance of the law.'22
Finally, opponents of the Leon decision contend that even if the
exclusionary rule's singular function is to deter police misconduct, the
Court wrongly applied its own cost-benefit test in determining that, in
the good faith context, the costs of exclusion greatly outweigh the de-
terrent benefits.' 23 Available data demonstrates that the majority over-
stated the costs associated with suppression of evidence. 2 " Empirical
evidence shows that cases rarely are dropped for prosecution and that
defendants seldom are acquitted as a result of exclusionary rule
problems. 25 This data leads to an often asked question: what was the
majority's real motive in proclaiming a good faith exception?
Commentators explain the Leon majority's decision as an attempt
to prevent the loss of convictions on fourth amendment grounds.
26
Critics contend that the Court, in effect, rewrote the Constitution to




122. Id. Justice Brennan warns that because the good faith exception removes "any incentive
to err on the side of constitutional behavior," police are encouraged "to adopt a 'let's-wait-until-
it's-decided' approach" when the warrant the officer requests is of questionable constitutionality.
Id.; see also Comment, United States v. Leon: Fourth Amendment Rights Eroded to Pre-Constitu-
tional Status, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 317, 335 (1985) (warning that "[1]ess than honest police officers
could manipulate the Leon standard in order to facilitate the apprehension of criminals").
123. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 92, at 632.
124. Leon, 468 U.S. at 950-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cites a series of
recent studies in which researchers measured the actual costs of the exclusionary rule. For exam-
ple, he cites a study prepared at the request of Congress by the General Accounting Office stating
that only 0.2% of all felony arrests are declined for prosecution because of the potential for exclu-
sion of evidence. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 14 (1979)).
125. Id. at 950-51 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. This approach explains why the court did not remand Leon under Gates as commenta-




whose fourth amendment rights were violated by an improper search.127
To facilitate more criminal convictions, the Court either could have fur-
ther emasculated the fourth amendment probable cause requirement or
narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule.128 Rather than directly at-
tack the Constitution, the majority took the less controversial approach
and denied a remedy for fourth amendment violations. 129 The result is
the same, however, because a right without a remedy is form without
substance. 30 Denying the exclusionary remedy to an accused whose
fourth amendment rights have been violated by an officer who relied on
a warrant lacking probable cause adds a good faith exception to the
explicit and unconditional probable cause requirement of the Constitu-
tion.13 1 The Court does not have the power to alter the Constitution by
substituting its own value judgments for that of the Framers. In adopt-
ing the fourth amendment, the Framers expressed that the protection
of fourth amendment rights is of greater importance than the creation
of a slightly more efficient criminal prosecution system.1 3 2 This judg-
ment is made on principle and is not susceptible to a cost-benefit analy-
sis of police behavior.13 3 The Leon Court implicitly disagreed with the
Framers' principle and, as a result, overturned long-standing constitu-
tional principles in the guise of "good faith" and "cost-benefit" scru-
tiny.13 4 As the Court earlier expressed in the case of Terry v. Ohio,3 5
subjective good faith can render the protections of the fourth amend-
ment meaningless and subject to the discretion of the police.13 6 In Jus-
tice Stevens' words, the Leon majority's evisceration of the Framers'
intent through removal of fourth amendment protections may be char-
acterized as "the product of Constitutional amnesia."1
3 7
127. See Comment, supra note 81, at 124 (noting that the Leon court acknowledged that the
warrant lacked probable cause, but admitted the illegally seized evidence, concluding that "the
good faith exception is not an exception to the exclusionary rule; it is an exception to the explicit
probable cause standard of the fourth amendment").
128. Note, supra note 92, at 637.
129. Id.
130. Id. (recognizing that "the distinction between directly attacking a textual right and de-
nying a remedy is specious").
131. Comment, supra note 81, at 124.
132. Id. at 128.
133. Id. The author analogized the principle underlying the exclusionary rule to the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution. In criminal trials, some
criminals go free because of insufficient evidence. Our society, however, values protecting the inno-
cent from an overzealous criminal prosecution system more than increasing the quantity of crimi-
nal convictions. Id. at 128-29.
134. See id.
135. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
136. Id. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
137. Leon, 468 U.S. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Leon and concurring in Sheppard).
Justice Stevens stated:
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C. Adverse Consequences of the Leon Decision
While there is very little empirical evidence to establish what im-
pact Leon has, in fact, had upon the criminal justice system, 3 8 com-
mentators assert that a number of adverse consequences invariably flow
from the decision. 139 A chief consequence of the Leon decision is to in-
sulate from effective review the magistrate's decision to issue war-
rants.140 The good faith exception sends an unequivocal message to
magistrates that mistakes made when reviewing warrant applications
are of virtually no consequence because an incorrect decision will not
preclude admission of evidence if the police relied in good faith on the
warrant.' Because the incentive carefully to review warrant applica-
tions is diminished, magistrates inevitably will devote less care and at-
tention to their important constitutional role.
42
The complete insulation of the magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination from subsequent judicial review creates a dangerous "super
magistrate.' 14 As a result, courts are virtually powerless to fulfill their
role as an essential safeguard of fourth amendment protections." As
recently as Illinois v. Gates,45 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the ma-
In short, the Framers of the [f]ourth [a]mendment were deeply suspicious of warrants; in
their minds the paradigm of an abusive search was the execution of a warrant not based on
probable cause. The fact that colonial officers had magisterial authorization for their conduct
when they engaged in general searches surely did not make their conduct "reasonable." The
Court's view that it is consistent with our Constitution to adopt a rule that it is presumptively
reasonable to rely on a defective warrant is the product of constitutional amnesia.
Id.
138. In a study of the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule conducted subsequent to the
United States v. Leon decision, the author concludes:
[T]he Court's decision in Leon threatens to undermine the institutional responses to the ex-
clusionary rule and the consistently correct search behavior they have fostered. These reforms
were created to make certain that a search warrant was sufficiently grounded in probable
cause. Leon may make this elaborate apparatus unnecessary. Some police officials believe
that, in the next "era of declining resources," the institutional reforms created in response to
the exclusionary rule may be in danger.
Comment, supra note 116, at 1054; see also Leon Has Little Practical Impact on Law Enforce-
ment Practices, Study Finds, 42 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2359 (1988) (citing a recent study by the
Police Executive Research Forum concluding that the good faith exception's impact on police
search warrant practices has been largely symbolic so far and predicting that Leon's effects will
become significant in the future, however, as law on the good faith exception develops).
139. See, e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 634-39.
140. Leon, 468 U.S. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. Justice Brennan stated: "Although the Court is correct to note that magistrates do
not share the same stake in the outcome of a criminal case as the police, they nevertheless need to
appreciate that their role is of some moment in order to continue performing the important task of
carefully reviewing warrant applications." Id.
143. Note, supra note 92, at 634.
144. See id.; see also supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
145. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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jority, emphasized that courts have a continuing obligation to ensure
that warrants are based on constitutionally sufficient affidavits. 14 6 Jus-
tice Rehnquist and the rest of the Leon majority seem to have forgotten
this command.147
The lack of effective review is even more dangerous because of the
minimal training and qualifications required of magistrates. A great
number of states do not require magistrates to have any legal training;
some states merely require a high school diploma, while others simply
require literacy. 14 The Leon decision puts great trust in the discretion
these magistrates exercise in deciding whether the constitutional re-
quirements are met sufficiently to permit a warrant to issue. In many
cases, however, the magistrate has had no legal instruction and cannot
exercise this discretion with knowledge of what the law commands. Be-
cause the good faith exception shields these magistrates' decisions from
subsequent review, the protection against conviction based on illegally
seized evidence is weakened.
4 9
Another problem arising from judicial deference to magistrates' de-
cisions is the practice of "magistrate shopping.' 50 Because a police of-
ficer knows that the magistrate's signature on a warrant is enough to
preserve illegally seized evidence, the officer may be tempted to seek
out the magistrate with the most lenient standards.' 51 In this scenario,
the probable cause requirement is reduced to obtaining the signature of
a lenient magistrate.
52
Because the good faith exception shields a magistrate's probable
cause determination from subsequent judicial review, critics fear that
Leon freezes the development of fourth amendment law.' 53 Despite the
majority's assertion that Leon does not prevent courts from reviewing
the defendant's fourth amendment claim before addressing the good
faith issue,5 practicality and precedent suggest a contrary finding.
Federal courts with crowded dockets cannot be expected to decide com-
plicated fourth amendment issues when the evidence is nevertheless ad-
missible.1 55  The companion case to Leon, Massachusetts v.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Note, supra note 92, at 635.





152. Id. at 636.
153. Id. at 637.
154. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925.
155. Note, supra note 92, at 638 (citing Brief for Respondent at 27, United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984)). For cases overlooking the fourth amendment issue by directly addressing the
good faith exception, see United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986); United
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Sheppard,15 ' followed this practical approach, postponing consideration
of the fourth amendment issue until after the Court determined
whether the good faith exception applied. The Sheppard Court refused
to decide the merits of the fourth amendment claim and dismissed it as
being of little importance.
157
Some commentators recognize that the most compelling criticism
of the good faith exception is that it dangerously weakens the probable
cause mandate of the fourth amendment.15 8 When Leon is applied in
conjunction with the lenient Gates standard, 59 the result is a "double
dilution" of the probable cause requirement.160 Critics fear that this ap-
plication would allow mere suspicion to take the place of probable cause
as a basic requirement for obtaining a search warrant.161 Warrants
based on mere suspicion, however, are exactly what the Framers of the
fourth amendment strived to prohibit.1 62 The good faith exception cre-
ates a dangerous potential for rendering obsolete the basic constitu-
tional safeguards regarding search and seizure., 3
Although the Leon majority announced four exceptions to the ap-
plication of the good faith doctrine,164 recent cases suggest that these
exceptions are disfavored and rarely utilized. The cases indicate a gen-
eral reluctance on the part of courts to find the good faith doctrine in-
applicable. This reluctance is evidenced by the use of restrictive
language when discussing the four exceptions. The Tenth Circuit re-
cently stated in United States v. Cardall"5 that the good faith excep-
tion is inapplicable only when underlying documents are "devoid of
factual support" and the officer's reliance is "wholly unwarranted. '" 166
The Fifth Circuit 6 7 recently echoed the Tenth Circuit's limiting lan-
guage, stating that in order for one of the exceptions in Leon to apply,
the warrant must be a "bare bones" list of "wholly conclusory state-
ments" or "devoid of factual support."'6 8 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit6 9
States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1957 (1985).
156. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
157. Id. at 988 n.5.
158. See, e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 636.
159. See supra note 6.
160. Note, supra note 92, at 636.
161. Comment, supra note 122, at 339.
162. Id.; see also N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
163. Comment, supra note 125, at 339.
164. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (1984).
165. 773 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1985).
166. Id. at 1133.
167. United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2920
(1986).
168. 778 F.2d at 1036.
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stated that the Leon exceptions to the good faith exception do not ap-
ply to an illegal warrant if it is not plainly evident that the magistrate
had no authority to issue the warrant.
17 0
An analysis of recent judicial treatment of each of the four explicit
exceptions to the good faith doctrine articulated in Leon shows how
rarely the exceptions are used to suppress evidence that Leon would
otherwise admit. First, the Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Dela-
ware,17 1 held that suppression is appropriate if a warrant is based on
knowingly or recklessly made falsehoods in the affidavit. 1 2 Some courts,
however, have held that the Franks-based exception does not require
suppression in every case in which an officer includes deliberate or reck-
less falsehoods in an affidavit. Rather, these courts impose a materiality
requirement under which evidence is admitted despite the falsehoods if
sufficient contents other than the misrepresentations establish probable
cause under the extremely lenient Gates standard. 7 3 Thus, an officer
may be able to include falsehoods in an affidavit in order to persuade a
magistrate to authorize a search that he otherwise would not allow, and
the evidence will not be suppressed if the rest of the affidavit indicates
probable cause.
Second, the Leon court stated that the good faith doctrine does not
apply if the magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role."'174 Subse-
quent cases demonstrate that proving such abandonment is difficult.
75
In United States v. Hendricks17 the Ninth Circuit found that a war-
rant to search a house for a suitcase lacked probable cause because the
issuing magistrate knew that the item was not inside the premises to be
searched. 77 Nevertheless, the court rejected the defendants' claim that
169. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 1457.
171. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
172. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509, 1512 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 951 (1987); State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 822, 693 P.2d 458, 468 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that the Leon decision "did not intend to create a blanket exception for every case exhib-
iting a Franks problem"). But see United States v. Boyce, 601 F. Supp. 947 (D. Minn. 1985) (stat-
ing that if a reviewing court finds a reckless or intentional misstatement in an affidavit,
suppression is required regardless of materiality).
174. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
175. See United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the defendant's
claim that the affidavit was so deficient that any magistrate issuing a warrant in reliance on it
would be acting merely as a rubber stamp, and holding that although the affidavit was insufficient
to establish probable cause, the magistrate did not abandon his judicial role), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1217 (1985); see also United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that
the good faith exception was appropriate despite the defendant's contention that the warrant was
issued on a "bare bones" affidavit).
176. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985).
177. 743 F.2d at 654-56. The magistrate issued a prospective warrant authorizing Drug En-
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the good faith exception should be inapplicable. Although the court ac-
knowledged that the magistrate abdicated to the investigating officers
an important judicial function, probable cause determination, the court
held that this abdication did not constitute the necessary abandonment
of his judicial role.'7 8
Under the third exception, evidence must be suppressed if a war-
rant is so "facially deficient" in failing to meet the particularity require-
ments that an officer cannot presume it to be valid. 17 9 The Supreme
Court failed to apply this exception in Massachusetts v. Sheppard.180
In Sheppard the warrant was a form warrant for controlled substances
that did not mention the items sought in the homicide investigation nor
those items that eventually were seized.""' Sheppard, because it ap-
pears to fit within this third exception, indicates that the allegedly lim-
iting principles announced in Leon are a spurious pretext to further the
objective of diluting fourth amendment safeguards. 182 A recent case il-
lustrating this concern is United States v. Anderson,'8" in which the
court rejected a "facial deficiency" exception to the good faith doctrine
after finding virtually no distinction between the facts at issue and the
facts in Sheppard.18 4 In Anderson the warrant described the items to
be seized as merely "property obtained in violation of the penal laws of
this state or any other state."'8 5 Despite the court's acknowledgement
that the warrant was facially deficient, the court nevertheless admitted
the items seized under the good faith doctrine. 86
The final exception, when an affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause" that no official could reasonably rely on the warrant, 87
forcement Administration (DEA) officials to search when they believed the suitcase had arrived at
the house. The court recognized that "[b]y issuing such a warrant, the magistrate abdicates to the
DEA agents an important judicial function-the determination that probable cause exists to be-
lieve that the objects are currently in the place to be searched." Id. at 655.
178. Id. at 656.
179. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
180. 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (the companion case to Leon).
181. Id. at 985-86. One commentator warns that if the "facial deficiency" exception does not
apply to prevent operation of the good faith exception in Sheppard, a case which factually falls
squarely within the exception, it is doubtful that the exception ever will be utilized. Note, supra
note 92, at 639. But see United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that officers
could not reasonably rely on a warrant invalidated because of insufficient particularity).
182. See Note, supra note 62, at 639 (stating that "Sheppard demonstrates that the good
faith exception is a pretext to effectuate the Burger Court's objective of squeezing the life out of
the fourth amendment").
183. 618 F. Supp. 1335 (D.D.C. 1985).
184. Id. at 1341-42.
185. Id. at 1337.
186. Id. at 1342.
187. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (1984) (citations omitted).
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has been met with equal disfavor and disuse.188 In the recent case of
United States v. Savoca89 the Sixth Circuit rejected a claim for sup-
pression of illegally seized evidence pursuant to this exception. The
warrant authorized the search of a motel room for evidence of a bank
robbery that the defendant allegedly had committed.1 90 The search
clearly was without probable cause, for three reasons: (1) the motel
room was not connected to the defendant other than by his having been
"seen" there; (2) the motel was located over 2,000 miles from the rob-
bery; and (3) the affidavit did not specify the amount of time that had
passed since the crime.1 91 In short, the defect was a lack of nexus be-
tween the place to be searched and the evidence sought.' 2 Neverthe-
less, the court held that a reasonably well trained officer could have
relied on the validity of the warrant.193 Reasoning that some cases have
upheld such "skeletal" affidavits, the court concluded that a reasonably
well trained officer could be aware of such decisions and might conclude
that the warrant at issue was not invalid. 94 This logic is dangerous be-
cause it seems to substitute reliance on what is reasonable with reliance
on what has been tolerated, seriously reducing the court's ability to find
an affidavit "unreasonably lacking in indicia of probable cause."
Other courts have expressed difficulty in applying the "indicia of
probable cause" exception to Leon, especially in light of the already
lenient probable cause standard announced in Illinois v. Gates. In
State v. Schaffer 95 the court recognized the difficulty of finding an affi-
davit so deficient that no basis for probable cause exists under Gates,
yet upon which an officer could reasonably rely.'9 The Schaffer court
188. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686, 690-91 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding evi-
dence to be admissible under Leon even though the search warrant was based almost entirely on
an informant's tip and that no information was provided concerning the informant's reliability and
credibility); United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir.) (rejecting the contention that
the "lacking of indicia" exception should apply while recognizing that the affidavit "arguably failed
to set forth an adequate basis upon which to determine the reliability and credibility of inform-
ant's information"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2920 (1985). But see Crittenden v. State, 476 So. 2d
626 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), afl'd 476 So. 2d 632 (Ala. 1985) (finding that officers were not entitled
to rely on a magistrate's determination of probable cause based on a "bare-bones" affidavit); State
v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 (N.D. 1985) (stating that the reliance on a magistrate's authori-
zation was unreasonable when the affidavit merely described "a most tenuous and conclusory"
suggestion of criminal conduct).
189. 761 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 294.
191. Id. at 294-95.
192. Id. at 295.
193. Id. at 298.
194. Id. at 297.
195. 107 Idaho 812, 693 P.2d 458 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
196. Id. at 812, 693 P.2d at 468. The court stated:
We confess that we are unsure how this quantum of evidence compares to the level needed to
support a probable cause determination under Gates. It splits a fine hair indeed to say that
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correctly recognized that the exceptions to Leon rarely will be employed
because of the breadth of the Leon holding and other decisions diluting
the fourth amendment, such as Gates and Sheppard. One commentator
warns that opening the way to discretionary enforcement of the good
faith exception creates "a slippery slope with limitless potential for
abuse."1
9 7
IV. EFFECT OF LEON ON THE APPLICATION OF REDACTION
Returning to the questions raised at the outset of this Note, what
effect should and does a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
have on the propriety of redacting an illegal search warrant containing
severable valid clauses? This inquiry can be made by analyzing two dis-
tinct scenarios. First, when the good faith doctrine is inapplicable, so
that suppression remains an appropriate remedy because the court
finds that one of the four exceptions to Leon applies, may a court nev-
ertheless utilize redaction to admit evidence seized pursuant to any
valid portions of the warrant? Second, when the facts of the case are
within the good faith doctrine as announced in Leon, should the of-
ficer's good faith compel the court to ignore redaction and admit all the
evidence seized despite severable invalid clauses? Or, should the court
sever the invalid portions and admit only legally seized evidence despite
the officer's good faith reliance?
A. When Leon Commands that "Suppression. . . Remains an
Appropriate Remedy"
The Supreme Court in Leon articulated four situations in which
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable and
the evidence is so deficient there is no "substantial basis" to find probable cause under a
"totality of circumstances," but that the evidence still is not "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."
197. Note, supra note 92, at 639; see also United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th
Cir. 1986). In Washington the warrant authorized seizure of records depicting sales of cocaine, but
the defendant claimed that the affidavit only established probable cause to search for evidence of
use of cocaine. The court recognized that "[t]his distinction between sale and use is critical be-
cause a warrant pertaining to drug sales would permit the officers to search through [defendant's]
papers, while a warrant restricted to drug use would not." Id. at 1467-68. Nevertheless, the court
avoided the fourth amendment claim and simply held that the evidence was admissible even if
probable cause was lacking because reliance on such a warrant was "objectively reasonable." Id. at
1474. This case arguably fits within the "lacking of indicia of probable cause" exception to Leon,
but the court did not address this possibility. The danger of the decision is the potential snowball
effect on invocation of the plain view doctrine. The court admitted papers seized outside the scope
of the warrant because they were found in plain view of the search for evidence of drug sales, but
acknowledged that if the warrant had been limited to a search for drug use, the prostitution evi-
dence would not have been admissible. Id. at 1468-69.
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suppression remains appropriate. 198 In holding that suppression of ille-
gally seized evidence is required in those four instances, the Court did
not consider whether something less than total suppression would be
permissible if the warrant was severable and contained valid clauses.
Nevertheless, considering the Court's sympathy with the prosecution
stance in Leon and other decisions that liberalize requirements for ad-
mission of evidence against criminals,199 the Court is likely to endorse
redaction in this situation. The Court predictably would conclude that
the mere fact that Leon's good faith doctrine cannot admit the evidence
does not preclude admission by another avenue.
However, because a warrant must be so egregiously deficient before
one of the four exceptions to Leon applies,200 redaction often will be
inappropriate in these situations. Redaction cannot be used to save mi-
nor valid clauses in an essentially general warrant.2 0 1 This limitation
serves to prevent an abuse of the warrant process. If redaction were
allowed in such cases, officers would try to obtain overly broad war-
rants, knowing that they could rely on redaction later if the reviewing
court found the warrant to be too general. Similarly, the instances in
which the good faith doctrine does not apply aim to prevent abuse of
warrants. If the good faith doctrine were to apply when reliance on the
warrant is not objectively reasonable, officers would try to obtain war-
rants with little or no justification, knowing that they later could rely
on the magistrate's authorization if the warrant subsequently was found
to be invalid.
Nevertheless, cases may exist in which one of the four exceptions to
Leon makes the good faith doctrine inapplicable while redaction re-
mains a viable alternative. In such a case, "objectively reasonable reli-
ance" on the warrant is not justified because of one or more egregiously
invalid clauses in the warrant, yet the warrant, considered as a whole,
contains substantial valid clauses that render the warrant not "essen-
tially general." The Ninth Circuit faced this situation in United States
v. Washington,0 2 in which the court invalidated two sections of a
search warrant that authorized the seizure of articles that would estab-
lish the financial status of the defendant and connect the defendant to
other persons, regardless of any possible criminal connection. 03 The
court held that these two clauses were so unconstitutionally overbroad
that they precluded an officer's objectively reasonable reliance on their
198. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
199. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (relaxing the probable cause standard).
200. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
202. 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
203. Id. at 1473.
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provisions.10 The court reasoned that the articles seized pursuant to
the invalid clauses must be suppressed under the "facially deficient"
exception to Leon.20 5 However, the court asserted that the evidence
seized pursuant to the valid portions of the warrant remained admissi-
ble.20 8 The court, in effect, redacted the warrant despite the taint of the
egregiously invalid clauses.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in
the recent case of United States v. Nader,0 7 similarly concluded that
redaction is available even when the good faith exception is inapplica-
ble. The warrant at issue was not broken into clauses, unlike the war-
rant in Washington, but merely listed seizable items.20 8 The court held
that the first six items on the list were described with particularity,209
but found the search to be illegal as to the seizure of items pursuant to
the broad description, "other photographs, magazines, writings and
documents which are evidence of violations of Title 18 U.S. Code sec-
tions 1461 and 1462. 121° According to the court, this language was un-
constitutional because it gave the officer discretion to determine what
was obscene and provided little guidance as to what should be seized.211
The court held that because this language in the warrant was so
"facially deficient," the good faith exception was inapplicable.212 Alter-
natively, the court considered redaction and concluded that it properly
could sever the general provisions of the warrant and uphold the war-
rant to the extent of the six particularly described items.21 3
Although these two decisions deal only with the "facially deficient"
exception to Leon, the same rationale applies in cases arising under one
of the remaining three exceptions. If a court finds a clause to be "so
lacking of indicia of probable cause" that an officer could not reasona-
bly rely on its validity, the clause should be stricken and the remaining
portions upheld, provided that the warrant as a whole is not unsup-
ported by probable cause. If the reviewing court finds that the magis-
trate "wholly abandoned his judicial role," the court should then look
further to determine what portions of the warrant were affected by this
abandonment. If the issuance is a general abdication of the magistrate's




207. 621 F. Supp. 1076 (D.D.C. 1985).
208. Id. at 1080.
209. Id. at 1081.
210. Id. at 1080-81.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1084 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citation omitted in original)).
213. Id. at 1085.
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cause it would permit an abuse of the warrant process in this context.
However, if the abandonment is only related to one or more minor por-
tions of an essentially valid warrant, redaction would be desirable. Fi-
nally, even if the court were to find that the officer recklessly or
intentionally included falsehoods in the affidavit, redaction still would
be appropriate to excise only those clauses authorized pursuant to the
misinformation, provided that the warrant generally is based on truth.
In these instances, redaction is desirable to admit probative, legally
obtained evidence to aid the prosecution. Redaction also is appropriate
because it accomplishes this goal without sacrificing the fourth amend-
ment protections that the Leon exceptions strive to safeguard. Even
when the Leon doctrine is inapplicable, no rational justification exists
for requiring suppression of all evidence seized pursuant to a warrant
containing severable valid clauses. When redaction is properly ap-
plied-that is, when it is applied only after the warrant as a whole is
found not to be essentially invalid-the concerns expressed by the Leon
court are not present. Application of redaction in such cases will not
lead to an abuse of the warrant process. Rather, redaction restores the
status quo. It places the prosecution and defense in the position they
would have been in had there been no illegal search. If the state had
not conducted the unlawful portion of the search, it would not have had
the evidence that redaction suppresses for use at trial. Redaction is nec-
essary to allow the prosecution to use probative evidence that the pros-
ecution would have been entitled to had there been no constitutional
violation.
B. When Leon Commands that "Application of the Extreme
Sanction of Exclusion Is Inappropriate"
One question that remained unanswered after Leon was whether
good faith reliance requires admission of all evidence seized pursuant to
the original invalid warrant or whether, in the case of severable war-
rants, redaction may be utilized to suppress evidence seized pursuant to
the excised portions. Redacting a severable warrant in this scenario to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to invalid clauses seems inconsistent
with the logic of Leon. The Leon Court reasoned that suppression of
evidence, even if illegally seized, is inappropriate when an officer relied
in good faith on a duly issued warrant because the costs of suppression
outweigh the resultant benefits. 14 Thus, Leon, because it admits evi-
dence based on an officer's good faith rather than a valid warrant, ap-
pears to conflict with the rationales supporting redaction. 15
214. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
215. Professor LaFave in his Treatise on the Fourth Amendment notes this contradiction
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The Eighth Circuit recently faced the conflict between the good
faith exception and redaction, resolving the conflict in favor of redac-
tion. In United States v. Haley216 the defendant objected to the admis-
sion of a gun that he claimed the officers had seized pursuant to a
search for items in the portions of a warrant that were unsupported by
probable cause after the officers had ceased searching for items in the
valid clauses.217 The court rejected the defendant's petition for redac-
tion, stating that because the officers had relied on the warrant in good
faith, a further search for the items in the invalid portions was
permissible.1 8
V. LEON AND THE STATE COURTS: A CONCLUSION
Despite the United States Supreme Court's decision in Leon, which
appears to preclude redaction in the scenario of good faith reliance on
warrants, state courts that desire to retain the benefits of redaction in
all cases of severable warrants nevertheless may choose to do so. How-
ever, in order to utilize redaction in the good faith exception context,
the state must reject Leon. State courts are not required to follow Leon,
for two reasons.21 9 First, Leon does not announce any new federal con-
stitutional doctrine. 220 The Court recognized that the exclusionary rule
is a judge-made remedy rather than a constitutional right of the ag-
grieved individual. 221 As such, the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule is only a federal rule of evidence and is not binding on the
states.222 Second, even if Leon is perceived to be a new federal constitu-
tional mandate, states consistent with the Supremacy Clause223 may in-
terpret their own constitutions to afford greater protections for their
between the process of redaction and the logic of Leon. W. LAFAVE, supra note 9. In discussing
redaction and endorsing it as a sound and desirable procedure, LaFave states that the tainted
portion of a severable warrant should be excised to exclude illegally seized evidence. Id. at 258. He
added a caveat in a footnote stating that under Leon's good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, "the partial invalidity of the warrant is not likely to require exclusion of evidence in any
event." Id. at 258, n.104.
216. 758 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 854 (1985).
217. Id. at 1296-97.
218. Id. at 1297; see also United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1220 n.11 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985) (denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to
an allegedly invalid clause of a severable warrant. The court noted that even if the clause was
invalid, Leon would allow admission of the evidence obtained by the officers who reasonably relied
on the warrant).
219. Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837, 846-47 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring); see
also Case Comment, supra note 78, at 562-64 (recommending that the Tennessee Supreme Court
reject the Leon good faith exception on state constitutional grounds).
220. See Stringer, 491 So. 2d at 847.
221. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 906).
222. Id.
223. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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individual citizens.224 A state can make such a determination even when
its own constitution contains provisions similar or identical to the fed-
eral constitution.225
The general effect of United States v. Leon on individual fourth
amendment protections is representative of the recent era of Supreme
Court decisions restricting individual federal constitutional rights.228 As
a result, a growing national trend has emerged among state courts to
construe their respective state constitutions to provide greater protec-
tion of individual liberties than currently is available under federal
law.2 27 To date, six states-Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New
York, Texas, and Wisconsin-explicitly have rejected Leon on state
constitutional grounds.22 s
State courts that reject Leon criticize both the Supreme Court's
logic and the adverse consequences that predictably will flow from its
adoption. These courts assert that the Leon Court's reasoning mis-
perceives the function of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent of police
misconduct, while ignoring the rule's importance in promoting institu-
tion-wide compliance with individual constitutional safeguards.2
Courts rejecting Leon further maintain that because the good faith ex-
ception eradicates any meaningful review of probable cause determina-
tions, 230 adoption of the exception encourages violations of individual
224. See Stringer, 491 So. 2d at 847.
225. See Case Comment, supra note 78, at 562 (citing Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 760
(Tenn. 1979)).
226. Id. at 561-62.
227. Id. at 562. The author quotes Justice Brennan who stated that "[sitate constitutions
. . . are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." Id. (quoting Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977)).
228. See State v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Stringer v. State, 491
So. 2d 837, 850 (Miss. 1986); State v. Novembrino, 491 A.2d 37 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985);
People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985); Polk v. State, 704
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 367 N.W.2d 816 (1985); see
also State v. Taylor, slip. op. No. 86-144-III (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1987) (expressing unwillingness
to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). But see State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260,
689 P.2d 519 (1984); McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Mers v. State, 482
N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Horsey, 676 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Welch, - N.C. -, 342 S.E.2d 789
(1986); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St. 3d 251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986); Commonwealth v. Melilli,
522 A.2d 1107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637
(1984); Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (Wyo. 1984).
229. See Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837, 849 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Robertson persuasively argued that the Supreme Court failed to perceive that in cases like
Leon, it is the magistrate, not the police officer, who violates the defendant's constitutional rights.
Thus, the need for the exclusionary rule in such cases is greater, because it is the only practicable
means to encourage magistrates to adhere to constitutional mandates in authorizing privacy inva-
sions. Id.
230. State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 238, 491 A.2d 37, 45 (1985).
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constitutional rights. 23 ' These courts maintain that the most compelling
reason to reject Leon is the necessity to protect the integrity of the
state's criminal justice process.
23 2
A state court rejecting the Supreme Court's good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule is free to utilize redaction and provide its citizens
with the benefits that redaction provides. 23 Redaction restores the sta-
tus quo by sending the case to trial with the prosecution and the de-
fense in the position each would have been in had there been no
unconstitutional search and seizure. As such, redaction promotes insti-
tutional compliance with fourth amendment protections, encouraging
both police officers and magistrates to comply with constitutional man-
dates. The integrity of the criminal justice system is preserved when a
court redacts invalid portions of a warrant. Whether or not the court
adheres to the unitary view, which holds that admission of illegally
seized evidence is itself a constitutional violation, redaction maintains
public respect for the law by excluding tainted evidence from criminal
trials. Moreover, redaction prohibits the freeze of fourth amendment
law feared by Leon critics because the redacting court must scrutinize
the warrant in every case for substantive compliance with the constitu-
tion. Finally, redaction provides the necessary vehicle to allow for mag-
istrates' technical mistakes in warrants, while preserving vital evidence
seized in an otherwise constitutional search.
For these reasons, many state courts have rejected Leon in favor of
redaction. These courts assert that the proper focus should be the ex-
tent of the invasion of the fourth amendment rights of the accused in
an unconstitutional search. An officer's good faith reliance on a warrant
cannot cure this violation. Redaction also cannot correct the violation,
but at least it provides a remedy for the affected individual. More im-
portantly, redaction discourages future privacy invasions.
When redaction is narrowly and properly applied, it is a desirable
solution to the traditional all-or-nothing exclusionary remedy for illegal
searches. United States v. Leon, on the other hand, seems to call for
all-or-nothing exclusion depending solely on whether an officer's reli-
ance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. However, in cases in
which one of the four exceptions to Leon applies, courts may utilize
redaction consistent with Leon to admit legally seized evidence that
Leon would otherwise suppress. In cases in which Leon calls for a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to permit admission of all
seized evidence, state courts should reject Leon in favor of redaction's
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 8-46 and accompanying text.
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middle ground approach. By rejecting Leon in favor of redaction, states
still can use suppression to preserve fourth amendment rights and also
admit legally obtained evidence necessary to prosecute criminals.
Rosemarie A. Lynskey

